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I. INTRODUCTION
A 1980 survey, sponsored by the United States government, ques-
tioned 15,900 high school seniors on their experiences with mari-
juana.1 As a result, 48.8% of the students admitted using marijuana
within the past twelve months; 33.7% admitted using it within the
past thirty days. It is estimated that 64% of all youth in America use
some form of illegal drugs before finishing high school. A 1982 study
showed that 29% of all youth were using marijuana.2 This figure was
down from 37% in 1979.3 Although marijuana use among American
youth seems to be slowly declining, it is still a serious problem, par-
ticularly in public schools.
A recent Supreme Court decision4 reflects the seriousness of the
drug problem among America's youth and the attitude school author-
ities as well as the courts are taking to combat that problem in public
schools. 5 In New Jersey v. TL.O., the Supreme Court originally
granted certiorari6 to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies to
searches conducted by public school officials in violation of the fourth
amendment.7 The Court, instead, addressed two other issues:
whether the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by
public school officials and the proper standard for determining the
reasonableness of such searches. The Court ruled that the fourth
1. P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE LAw 86-88 (3d ed. 1984).
2. This later study was conducted by the University of Michigan School of Social
Research. Id. at 88.
3. Id.
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
5. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affd, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (bringing marijuana sniffing dogs and their
trainers into the classrooms of a junior and senior high school in order to aid officials
in detecting drug abuse in the school was not considered a search for fourth amend-
ment purposes).
6. 104 S. Ct. 480 (1983).
7. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984) (the Supreme Court restored
the case to the calendar for reargument on the question of whether the vice principal's
search did in fact violate the fourth amendment).
amendment is applicable,8 but the standard for determining the rea-
sonableness of searches by school officials requires only a reasonable
suspicion to search rather than probable cause.9 The Court also held
that searches by public school authorities are exempt from the war-
rant requirement.10
At first glance, the apparent effect of this decision is to recognize
the fourth amendment rights of public school students. However, the
warrant exception and the Supreme Court's strict application of the
reasonable suspicion standard severely limit, and possibly over-
whelm, any fourth amendment rights held by students.
This Note will examine the legal history of the applicability of the
fourth amendment to public school searches and the different ap-
proaches that the state and federal courts have taken regarding this
issue. This Note will further analyze the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. TLO, the impact it will have on public school
officials, as well as on students and parents, and the fourth amend-
ment questions regarding public school searches left unanswered by
the court.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC SCHOOL SEARCHES
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . ."11 In order for a search to
be deemed reasonable, it must be conducted pursuant to a warrant
which is based upon probable cause 12 and issued by a detached mag-
istrate.13 Thus, a search conducted without a warrant is per se unrea-
sonable,14 and the evidence seized therefrom will be inadmissible in
federall5 and state16 courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
recognized a few specific exceptions to the warrant requirement 17
8. 105 S. Ct. at 739.
9. Id. at 743-44.
10. Id. at 743.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing [that a crime] had [been] committed or was [be-
ing] committed." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
13. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
15. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary rule established).
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule's applicabil-
ity to state courts.)
17. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (a warrantless search con-
ducted pursuant to "consent" was recognized as a valid search under the fourth
amendment); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (evidence seized in "plain
view" without a warrant was admissible); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (the
"exigencies of the situation" permitted a warrantless search); United States v. Rabino-
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and to the probable cause requirement.18
Until the decision in New Jersey v. TL.O.,19 the Supreme Court
had never addressed the question of whether the fourth amendment
applies to student searches by public school officials.20 For this rea-
son, the state and federal courts have different views and rationaliza-
tions regarding the applicability of the fourth amendment to searches
by public school officials.21
In struggling to reach an acceptable balance between the interests
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search "incident to a valid arrest" was deemed
proper); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (a warrantless search of an "auto-
mobile" did not violate the fourth amendment). It is important to note that a warrant-
less search falling under an exception must still be based upon probable cause to be
held reasonable. For a discussion of cases which categorize public school searches as
falling within one of the recognized warrant exceptions, see Trosch, Williams &
DeVore, Public School Searches and the Fourth Amendment 11 J.L. & EDUC. 41, 46-48
(1982). See also Frels, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools, 11 Hous. L. REV. 876,
882-87 (1974).
18. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (an officer may detain an automo-
bile to check the driver's license and vehicle registration based upon a "reasonable sus-
picion" that the driver is unlicensed, the vehicle is unregistered, or there has been a
violation of the law); United States v. Marinez-Fuerte, 248 U.S. 543 (1976) (detaining
vehicles at a permanent border checkpoint on a major highway without an individual-
ized suspicion is legal); United States v. Brignoni-Poince, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border
patrol officer may briefly detain a car at the border if he "reasonably suspects" the
vehicle to contain illegal aliens); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (an officer may "stop
and frisk" a suspect whom he "reasonably believes" to be armed and dangerous).
In accepting the lower standard of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause,
the Supreme Court determined that the minimal intrusion of the "brief" detention
must give way to the strong governmental and public interests of safeguarding citizens
and law enforcement officials. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30. It should be emphasized that,
in these cases, the searches were merely "brief detentions," not full-scale searches.
19. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
20. However, the Court has ruled upon the applicability of the first, eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the same situation. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (students do not "shed their [first amend-
ment] constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students who have been suspended from
school are entitled to protections under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in
public schools).
At first glance, the inapplicability of the eighth amendment seems inconsistent with
the applicability of the first and fourteenth amendments. However, the Court has em-
phasized that the prohibition by the eighth amendment of excessive bail, excessive
fines, or cruel and unusual punishment "was designed to protect those who had been
convicted of crimes." Ingraham 430 U.S. at 664. Students, when disciplined by public
school officials, are not convicted criminals, hence, the inapplicability of the eighth
amendment.
21. For a discussion of the different views adopted by the courts regarding
searches by public school officials, see Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 978, 985-89 (1973 & Supp.
1984).
and protected rights of students and the duty of school officials to
provide a safe learning environment, the courts have generally
reached four different conclusions:
1) The fourth amendment does not apply to searches conducted by
public school officials. Therefore, public school searches are not sub-
ject to fourth amendment restrictions. 22
2) The fourth amendment applies to searches by public school offi-
cials, but the exclusionary rule does not.23
3) The fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule both apply to
searches by public school officials, and such searches must be based
upon probable cause.24
22. Courts reaching this conclusion recognize school officials as private parties act-
ing in loco parentis. In loco parentis is defined as: "[i]n the place of a parent."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, the students have no fourth
amendment rights.
See R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (a search of a student by the
vice principal and a school security guard is not governmental action, rendering the
seized evidence admissible); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(school officials are public employees, but not law enforcement officers, rendering the
fourth amendment inapplicable); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1969) (vice principal is not a governmental official within the context of the
fourth amendment, but is an authority whose primary responsibility is to maintain
discipline in the school setting, not to obtain convictions). The view taken by these
courts emphasizes the importance of providing a safe environment, conducive to learn-
ing for students as well as teachers above and beyond recognizing the rights of stu-
dents under the fourth amendment.
For a critique of the in loco parentis doctrine as a justification for public school offi-
cials' immunity from operation of the fourth amendment, see Trosch, Williams &
DeVore, supra note 17, at 53-54. See also Comment, School Officials' Authority to
Search Students Is Augmented by the "In Loco Parentis" Doctrine, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 526, 527-31 (1977); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in
Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 765-68 (1974). These authors assert that the use of
the common law doctrine of in loco parentis as a justification for public school offi-
cials' fourth amendment immunity is in "direct conflict with its underlying theory," to
stand in place of the parent. Comment, supra, at 531. Very rarely would a parent
search his or her child for drugs which would be used against the child in criminal
proceedings.
23. The Georgia courts have adopted this view. The rationale is that the exclu-
sionary rule's basic purpose, to deter law enforcement misconduct, would not be
served. See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975) (Public school offi-
cials are state officers whose conduct is subject to fourth amendment restrictions, but
not to the exclusionary rule. The fourth amendment applies to state action, whereas
the exclusionary rule applies to state law enforcement action.)
24. See Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 530, 542, 208
Cal. Rptr. 657, 665, (1984) (the fourth amendment, including the probable cause stan-
dard, and the exclusionary rule are applicable to searches by public school officials in
criminal and juvenile proceedings, but are not applicable in school disciplinary pro-
ceedings); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975) (a warrantless search of a student's
wallet by a physical education teacher was held to be unreasonable because none of
the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applied).
But see M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (Second Circuit recognized
the lower standard of reasonableness for public school searches, but expressed "that as
the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amendment 'reason-
ableness' approaches probable cause, even in the school context"); see M. v. Board of
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4) The fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule both apply to
searches by public school officials, but searches need only be based
upon a reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.25
In New Jersey v. TL.O.,26 the Supreme Court adopted a modified
version of the fourth view,27 which was the majority view of the state
and federal courts that have decided this issue. Searches by public
school officials were held to create another exception to the warrant
requirement.2 8 The Court never reached the question of whether the
exclusionary rule applies to these searches. 29 Therefore, evidence
seized in a warrantless search by a public school official, which was
based upon a reasonable suspicion, may be used against students both
in school disciplinary proceedings and in criminal proceedings.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In New Jersey v. TL.O., a vice principal found marijuana while
searching a female student's purse for cigarettes after the student
Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist., 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977)
(probable cause needed to search a student when police are involved, but only a rea-
sonable suspicion needed if police are not involved).
25. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481 (5th Cir.
1982) (the "reasonable cause" needed before a school official can invade a student's pri-
vacy is less stringent than the standard to which law enforcement officials are held);
State ex reL L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 601, 280 N.W.2d 343, 351 (1979) ("a warrantless search
by a teacher or school official is reasonable if it is based upon a reasonable suspicion
that a student has a dangerous or illegal item or substance in his possession"); State v.
McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977) (vice principal should not be
held to the same probable cause standard as law enforcement officials, but should be
allowed to search a student if he has "reasonable grounds" on which to base search
needed to maintain order and discipline).
Courts reaching this conclusion regard school officials as governmental officials, and
therefore subject to the fourth amendment restrictions. They emphasize that a princi-
pal's primary duty is to provide a safe and orderly learning environment, not to dis-
cover and prevent crime. In order to provide a safe learning environment, discipline
must be maintained. This often requires the principal and other school officials to
take immediate action which "cannot await the procurement of a search warrant based
upon probable cause." McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, 558 P.2d at 784. The inherent
need to maintain discipline in school so that the educational process can proceed justi-
fies lowering the probable cause standard to a reasonable suspicion standard. This
view considers both the students' fourth amendment rights as well as the need for a
safe educational environment and attempts to reach an acceptable balance between the
two.
26. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. 105 S. Ct. at 743. For a list of the other well-delineated exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, see supra note 17.
29. Id. at 739 n.3. See also note 62.
had denied an allegation of smoking cigarettes in the girls' restroom.
On March 7, 1980, a Piscataway High School30 teacher observed four-
teen year old T.L.O. [hereinafter Respondent] and another student
smoking cigarettes in the girls' restroom in violation of a school
rule.3 1 The teacher took the two students to the assistant vice princi-
pal's office where Respondent denied smoking in the restroom.32 In
fact, she told the vice principal that she "did not smoke at all."33
Thereafter, the vice principal requested to see Respondent's purse.
While inspecting it the first item he found was a package of ciga-
rettes. As removed the cigarettes, a package of cigarette rolling pa-
pers came into view.34 After finding the cigarette rolling papers, the
vice principal proceeded to thoroughly search Respondent's purse.
As a result, he found: a small amount of marijuana,35 a pipe,36 an in-
dex card listing students who owed Respondent money,37 and two
letters implicating Respondent in marijuana dealing.38
Upon finding marijuana and other paraphernalia, the vice principal
reported the incident to the police.39 The Respondent's mother was
also notified. Pursuant to police request, Respondent's mother took
her daughter to police headquarters where Respondent confessed to
selling marijuana at school.40
The State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against Re-
spondent in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex
County.41 The state charged Respondent with possession of mari-
juana with the intent to distribute. Respondent was also suspended
from school for three days.42
30. Piscataway High School is located in Middlesex County, New Jersey.
31. The rules and regulations of Piscataway High School allowed students to pos-
sess cigarettes and smoke cigarettes in certain designated areas. However, the girls'
restroom was an area where cigarette smoking was strictly forbidden. State ex reL
T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 347, 354, 463 A.2d 934, 942, 946 (1983).
32. Respondent's companion admitted to the vice principal that she had been
smoking in the girls' restroom. She was then assigned to a smoking clinic. Id. at 336,
463 A.2d at 936.
33. State In Interest of T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 335, 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1980).
34. Based upon the vice principal's experience with students, he knew that ciga-
rette rolling papers were closely associated with the marijuana use. 94 N.J. at 336, 463
A.2d at 936.
35. The net weight of the marijuana found in Respondent's purse was 5.4 grams.
State ex reL T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 283 n.1, 448 A.2d 493, 495 n.1 (1982).
36. The pipe found was a metal one, a type commonly used for smoking mari-
juana. 94 N.J. at 336, 463 A.2d at 936.
37. Respondent's purse contained forty dollars, most of which were in single dol-
lar bills. Id. at 337, 463 A.2d at 936.
38. Id.
39. The marijuana and other evidence was eventually turned over to the police.
178 N.J. Super. at 335, 428 A.2d at 1330.
40. At police headquarters, Respondent admitted selling eighteen to twenty mari-
juana cigarettes for one dollar each the day of the incident. Id
41. Id. at 329, 428 A.2d at 1327.
42. Respondent's original suspension was ten days: three days for smoking
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B. Juvenile Court Proceedings
During the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court proceedings,43
Respondent filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the vice
principal, asserting that the search of her purse violated the fourth
amendment.44 In considering Respondent's motion to suppress, the
juvenile court held: that the fourth amendment is applicable to
searches by public school officials;45 that the standard of reasonable-
ness needed to conduct a search is lowered from probable cause to a
reasonable suspicion;46 and that the vice principal's search of Respon-
dent's purse was reasonable under the circumstances. 47 Based upon
these findings, the juvenile court denied Respondent's motion to
cigaretttes in a no smoking area and seven days for possession of marijuana. However,
the seven day suspension for possessing marijuana was set aside at a hearing by the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division. The Chancery Division held that
the marijuana was evidence seized in a search violating the fourth amendment. T.L.O.
v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., No. C-2865-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 31, 1980).
This decision was not appealed by the Board of Education. 105 S. Ct. at 737 n.1.
43. 178 N.J. Super. at 329, 428 A.2d at 1327.
44. Respondent also asserted that the motion to suppress the evidence be granted
on the grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata. This assertion was based upon
the Chancery Division's holding that the search of Respondent's purse violated the
fourth amendment. See supra note 42. However, the juvenile court denied Respon-
dent's motion to suppress based on these doctrines because the school beard, not the
State of New Jersey, was named in the Chancery Division proceeding. 178 N.J. Super
at 329, 428 A.2d at 1335. See also Kugler v. Bannner Pontiac-Buick, Opel, Inc., 120 N.J.
Super. 572, 295 A.2d 385 (1972) (Attorney General was not precluded from bringing
suit on grounds of res judicata nor collateral estoppel even though defendant had pre-
viously been acquitted in a municipal court).
45. 178 N.J. Super. at 345, 428 A.2d at 1335-1340.
46. The standard for determining the reasonableness of a search, adopted by the
juvenile court, was "a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of
being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to main-
tain school discipline or enforce school policies." Id, at 341, 428 A.2d at 1333 (emphasis
in original).
47. The court acknowledged five factors to be considered as guidelines in deter-
mining whether searches by public school officials are reasonable under the lower
"reasonable suspicion" standard:
(1) the child's age, history and school record;
(2) the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the
search was directed;
(3) the exigency of the situation requiring an immediate warrantless search;
(4) the probative value and reliability of the information used as a justifica-
tion for the search;
(5) the teacher's prior experience with the student.
Id. at 342, 428 A.2d at 1334. The court reasoned that the search of Respondent's purse
was reasonable under the facts and circumstances present because a teacher had ob-
served Respondent smoking in a prohibited area. Therefore, the vice principal's action
to determine whether a violation had occurred was warranted. Id,
suppress.48
C. New Jersey Appellate Court Proceedings
Respondent appealed the juvenile court's denial of the motion to
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. The appellate
court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence
based upon the opinion of the juvenile court.49 Respondent then ap-
pealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The supreme court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and
granted Respondent's motion to suppress the evidence.5 0 The court
agreed with the lower courts' rulings on the applicability of the
fourth amendment and exclusionary rule to public school searches5'
as well as the lower court's statement of the standard for determin-
ing the reasonableness of the search.52 In addition, the supreme
court held even though the fourth amendment applies, public school
officials need not secure a search warrant in order to search stu-
dents.53 This reversal was based on the application of the lower stan-
dard of determining the reasonableness of the search of Respondent's
48. The juvenile court followed the majority rule regarding searches conducted by
public school officials. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982).
50. State ex reL T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
51. Id at 341-42, 349-50, 463 A.2d at 939, 943-44 See supra note 64.
52. Id. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-42. The supreme court defined the lower standard to
exist "when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses
evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and
order." Id at 346, 463 A.2d at 941. The supreme court also acknowledged the same
five factors considered by the juvenile court in determining the reasonableness of a
public school search. See note 47. This standard is very similar to the standard
adopted by the juvenile court. See supra note 46.
53. 94 N.J. at 342, 343, 463 A.2d at 939, 940. The court's reasoning for making
searches by public school officials an exception to the warrant requirement was based
upon the fact that the New Jersey Legislature had passed a number of statutes grant-
ing school authorities certain powers to maintain safety, order, and discipline within
the schools. Id. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 1968) (school employees
have been granted the power to "Apply such amounts of force as is reasonable and
necessary to. . .obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:25-2 (West 1985) ("a teacher or other person in authority over such pupil
shall hold every pupil accountable for disorderly conduct"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:37-1
(West 1968) (students are required to "comply with the rules established in pursuance
of law for the government of such schools . . .and submit to the authority of the
teachers and others in authority"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-2j (West Supp. 1985)
(school officials have the power to punish and suspend any pupil who is guilty of
"(k]nowing possession or knowing consumption ... of alcoholic beverages or con-
trolled dangerous substances on school premises, or being under the influence of intox-
icating liquor or controlled dangerous substances on school premises").
After reviewing the state statutory scheme, the supreme court concluded that "these
statutes yield the proposition that school officials, within the school setting, have the
authority to conduct reasonable searches necessary to maintain safety, order, and disci-
pline within the schools." 94 N.J. at 343, 463 A.2d at 940. Thus, the warrant require-
ment is unsuited for the school environment.
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purse.5 4 The supreme court found that the vice principal's search
was not reasonable because Respondent had not violated a school
rule that would seriously interfere with maintaining discipline or
safety in the school and thus granted Respondent's motion to
suppress.55
After the supreme court's reversal of the lower court's denial of
the motion to suppress, the state petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. In its petition, the state asked the
Supreme Court to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies to
searches conducted by public school officials that violate the fourth
amendment. 56
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 to decide the sole issue of
whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized in a search
by a public school official which violates the fourth amendment. 58
After hearing oral arguments on the exclusionary rule applicability
issue, for which the Court originally granted certiorari, the Court re-
quested reargument 9 to decide the additional issue of whether the
vice principal's search of Respondent's purse did in fact violate the
fourth amendment.60 On re-argument, the Supreme Court held that
the vice principal's search did not violate the fourth amendment,61
54. The court reasoned that mere possession of cigarettes did not constitute crimi-
nal activity nor did it violate a school rule; therefore, the contents of Respondent's
purse had no direct bearing on the infraction. 94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942.
55. Id.
56. Brief for Petitioner at i, State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
57. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 480 (1984).
58. See supra note 56.
59. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984).
60. Before the Supreme Court had ruled on New Jersey v. T.L.O., Professor Yale
Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law School speculated that the reasoning be-
hind the request for reargument was to avoid deciding the exclusionary rule issue alto-
gether. Kamisar speculated that the Court may not have had the five votes needed to
hold the exclusionary rule inapplicable to public school searches. See Stewart, And in
Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J. 50, 54 (1985). It should be
noted that this article was drafted prior to the Supreme Court's ruling on New Jersey
v. T.L.O., even though it was published in the journal after the decision.
61. 105 S. Ct. at 738, 739.
In holding that the search of [Respondent's] purse did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities ....
Thus, our determination ... implies no particular resolution of the question
of the applicability of the exclusionary rule. Id.
thereby avoiding the exclusionary rule issue completely.62
1. Public School Officials Are Held to Be Government Officials
Subject to Fourth Amendment Restrictions
The first issue addressed by the Court was whether the fourth
amendment applies to searches by public school officials. 63 In hold-
ing that the fourth amendment does apply, the Court based its deci-
sion on three grounds.
First, the fourth amendment has long been recognized by the
Court as a protection of students' rights against invasions by public
school authorities.64 Because the fourth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment,65 school officials are not
immune from the fourth amendment when searching students.
Second, searches by public school officials were analogized by the
Court to searches by other governmental officials who were not law
enforcement officers. 66 In reviewing its past decisions, the Court re-
iterated that not only had it held law enforcement officials to be
bound by the restrictions of the fourth amendment, but other govern-
mental officials were also bound, including: building inspectors;67
OSHA inspectors;68 and firefighters.69 The Court stated that the
principal purpose of the fourth amendment "is to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by govern-
mental officials,"70 not just law enforcement officials. The Supreme
Court concluded that public school officials should be bound by the
62. Id.
63. 105 S. Ct. at 739.
64. As precedent for the assertion that students are entitled to fourteenth amend-
ment protections, the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not ex-
cepted. These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That
they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protec-
tion of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.
Id. at 739-40 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943) (emphasis added).
65. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. On reargument the state asserted that the history of the fourth amendment
suggested that it should only apply to searches conducted by law enforcement officials.
105 S. Ct. at 740.
67. Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (searches conducted by build-
ing inspectors without a warrant are unreasonable under the fourth amendment).
68. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (a warrantless inspection con-
ducted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 violates the fourth
amendment).
69. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1983) (firefighters entering premises to inves-
tigate the cause of a fire must first procure a search warrant).
70. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added).
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restrictions imposed by the fourth amendment as are other non-law
enforcement governmental officials. 71
Third, the minority rule, adopted by lower courts that consider
teachers as in loco parentis72 and immune from fourth amendment
restrictions, was rejected. The Court reiterated the fact that it had
previously recognized students' first amendment 73 and fourteenth
amendment rights.7 4 It reasoned that there is no justification for de-
nial of students' fourth amendment rights in the schoolhouse setting.
Another reason supporting the Court's rejection of the in loco paren-
tis view, was that today, teachers are granted authority through state
statutes, 75 not through parents. Hence, public school officials were
held to be governmental officials, subject to the restrictions of the
fourth amendment. 76
2. Searches Conducted by Public School Officials Held to Be
Another Exception to the Warrant Requirement and
Probable Cause Standard
The second issue addressed by the Court was twofold: (1) whether
public school officials needed to obtain a warrant before searching
students, and (2) the degree of suspicion needed to conduct such
searches. In holding that public school officials need not obtain a
warrant 77 nor have probable cause to search a student,78 the
Supreme Court applied a "balancing test" between the students' ex-
pectation of privacy in the school setting and the teachers' need to
maintain order so that the educational process can proceed.7 9
71. 105 S. Ct. at 741.
72. See supra note 22.
73. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(schoolchildren do not shed their first amendment free speech rights upon entering
the schoolhouse gates). The Court, in Tinker, did limit students' first amendment
rights. When a student's behavior "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others," free speech immunity will not be rec-
ognized. Id, at 513.
74. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students who have been suspended or
expelled from school are entitled to procedural due process).
75. The State of New Jersey has adopted such a statutory scheme. See supra note
53 and accompanying text.
76. 105 S. Ct. at 741.
77. Id. at 743.
78. Id.
79. The majority claimed that "[t]he determination of the standard of reasonable-
ness governing any specific class of searches requires 'balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.'" Id at 741 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at
536-537). "On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expecta-
The Court recognized a student's legitimate expectation of privacy
in their person and in their personal effects.8 0 However, a student's
expectation of privacy in the school setting must give way to the
teacher's need to maintain order in the classroom. It is imperative
that teachers be delegated the authority and means to maintain disci-
pline so that a safe learning environment is provided and the educa-
tional process is performed uninterrupted because "[e]vents calling
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require imme-
diate, effective action."8 1
Moreover, to require a teacher to obtain a search warrant before
searching a student suspected of violating a law or school rule would
seriously interfere with disciplinary proceedings as well as the educa-
tional process itself. The warrant requirement is thus not appropri-
ate in the unique setting of the schoolhouse, and one need not be
obtained in order for a public school official to search a student.8 2
The same balancing test analysis, used to justify the warrant excep-
tion,8 3 was used to justify lowering the standard to determine the
reasonableness of a student search by a public school official from
probable cause to a reasonable suspicion.8 4 In certain limited circum-
stances, where the public interest is best served by applying a reason-
ableness test rather than the probable cause standard, the Court has
not hesitated in adopting the lower reasonable suspicion standard.85
To determine the reasonableness of a student search the Court for-
mulated a two prong test. "[F]irst, one must consider 'whether the
tions of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effec-
tive methods to deal with breaches of public order." Id.
In applying the "balancing test," the majority expressed that it was the rule to deter-
mine the reasonableness of any class of searches. However, probable cause is the rule,
and the "balancing test" is the exception. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying
text. See also infra note 109 for a discussion and criticism of the majority's application
of the "balancing test" as the rule.
80. On reargument, the state asserted that schoolchildren have essentially no le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in their articles "unnecessarily" brought into the
schoolhouse. The Court rejected this argument. 105 S. Ct. at 742.
81. Id. at 743 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
82. 105 S. Ct. at 743. Interestingly, however, the Court ignores the fact that the
principal had the purse, the student, and the time to obtain the warrant in this case.
Of course, no warrant could be issued if the purse were to remain unopened in the
principal's office because the principal had no reasonable suspicion that the student
possessed marijuana. This issue, which remained undecided by the Court, goes to the
heart of the intrusion that the student alleged was the violation of her constitutional
rights. In declining to issue an opinion on the exclusionary rule's applicability to this
case, the Court is left with the prospect of facing it later. (See notes 129-138 and ac-
companying test, Stevens, J. dissenting).
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 743. The Supreme Court thereby followed the majority of the
state courts that had ruled upon this issue. See supra note 25.
85. See supra note 18 for a discussion of cases in which it was held that, under the
circumstances, a reasonable suspicion standard was more appropriate than the prob-
able cause standard.
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... action was justified at its inception'. .. 86 [and] second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.' "87 In adopting this lower standard, the Court
struck a balance between the students' expectation of privacy and the
school officials' and public's interest in maintaining order in the
classroom.88
3. The Vice Principal's Full-Scale Search of Respondent's Purse
was Reasonable
After applying the two-prong test adopted for determining the rea-
sonableness of public school searches,89 the Court held the vice prin-
cipal's search of Respondent's purse to be reasonable, thereby
overruling the holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court.90 The ra-
tionale supporting the Court's finding that the search was reasonable,
and therefore legal, was two-fold.
First, the Court rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court's assump-
tion that because possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school
rules, the contents of Respondent's purse would have "no direct bear-
ing on the infraction."91 In fact, the Supreme Court asserted the con-
trary, that possession of cigarettes would be evidence relevant to the
circumstances because it would both confirm the teacher's allegation
that Respondent was smoking in the restroom as well as undermine
86. 105 S. Ct. at 744 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). In Terry, the
two prong "stop and frisk" test was established. For the first time, the Court deter-
mined a search to be reasonable based upon a suspicion less than probable cause.
The first prong of the two prong test relates to the "stop" element. The T.L.O.
Court held that a search satisfies this first prong, "when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school." 105 S. Ct. at 744. This standard is
very similar to the standards applied by both the juvenile court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court. See supra notes 46 & 52.
87. 105 S. Ct. at 744 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). The second prong of the Terry
test, relating to the scope of the search, is met "when the measures adopted are rea-
sonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." (footnote omitted).
Id.
88. The reasonableness standard adopted here will enable teachers to regulate
their conduct based upon common sense rather than some interpretation of the prob-
able cause standard. Application of reasonableness standard should invade a student's
privacy only to the extent needed to maintain order in the classroom. Id.
89. See supra notes 86, 87 and accompanying text.
90. 105 S. Ct. at 746.
91. Id. at 745. See supra note 54.
Respondent's denial of "not smoking at all." 92 Even though the pos-
session of cigarettes was not a violation of a school rule, it would pro-
duce evidence of a school rule violation. Hence, the finding of
cigarettes would supply "the necessary 'nexus' between the item
searched for and the infraction under investigation." 93
Second, and also rejected, was the New Jersey Supreme Court's
conclusion that the vice principal did not have a reasonable suspicion
that Respondent's purse would, in fact, contain cigarettes.94 The
Court was troubled by the lower court's finding that, at best, the vice
principal had only a "hunch" that Respondent's purse contained
cigarettes. 95
Immediately prior to the search, a teacher had witnessed Respon-
dent smoking cigarettes in the girls' restroom. It was reasonable to
assume that cigarettes were present somewhere, and the most obvi-
ous place was in Respondent's purse. The vice principal had, there-
fore, more than a "hunch;" 96 he had come to a "common sense
conclusio[n]"97 that Respondent's purse did, in fact, contain ciga-
rettes. As a result, the vice principal did have a reasonable suspicion
that Respondent possessed cigarettes in her purse, and it was there-
fore reasonable for him to search the purse.98
92. Id. This confirmation would not be absolute upon the finding of cigarettes in
Respondent's purse. However, relevant evidence need not be conclusive, but only have
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence." Id. at 746 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 401).
93. 105 S. Ct. at 746. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In Warden, it was
held permissible to:
conduct .. .searches for the purpose of obtaining evidence which would aid
in apprehending and convicting criminals. The requirements of the Fourth
Amendment can secure the same protection of privacy whether the search is
for "mere evidence" or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband. There
must, of course, be a nexus ... between the item to be seized and criminal
behavior. Thus in the case of "mere evidence," probable cause must be ex-
amined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a par-
ticular apprehension or conviction.
387 U.S. at 306-07 (emphasis added).
94. 105 S. Ct. at 746.
95. 94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
vice principal had no reasonable grounds to believe that the Respondent's purse con-
tained cigarettes because no one had reported to him that the purse had cigarettes in
it. Therefore, his search of the purse was unreasonable.
96. 105 S. Ct. at 746. The Terry Court held that in determining the reasonableness
of a stop and frisk search "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences ...
[drawn] from the facts in light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
97. See United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (law enforcement officers
are entitled to formulate common sense conclusions when developing a particularized
suspicion).
98. 105 S. Ct. at 746. The Court emphasized that a reasonable suspicion need not
be an absolute certainty, but pointed out that "sufficient probability, not certainty is
the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)).
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The fact that the vice principal found cigarette rolling papers in
Respondent's purse while searching for cigarettes gave him "reason
to suspect" marijuana was also present.9 9 Thus, the full-scale search
of Respondent's purse was reasonable, and the evidence seized there-
from was held to be admissible in criminal proceedings brought by
the state.10 0
The effect of the Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
was recognition of schoolchildren's fourth amendment rights. How-
ever, classifying searches of students by public school officials as an-
other well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement, as well
as to the probable cause standard, severely limits these recognized
rights.
B. Concurring Opinions
1. The Uniqueness of the School Setting Justifies A Limitation
on Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
Justice Powell joined the majority opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
and also filed a concurring opinion, stressing the special characteris-
tics of the school setting and the teacher-student relationship as pri-
mary justifications for limiting the fourth amendment rights of
students.' 0 ' First, according to Justice Powell, students do have a
somewhat diminished expectation of privacy while in the classroom
because of their close association with teachers and other students.
For hours each school day, students are constantly supervised by
school officials who know them quite well.'0 2 Thus, it is not realistic
to think that students have the same expectation of privacy at school
as they do in everyday society.10 3
Second, the special relationship between teachers and students pro-
vided justification for the Court's limitation of schoolchildrens'
fourth amendment rights. The teacher-student relationship is not
like the law enforcer-criminal relationship. The latter is an adver-
sary relationship, while the former is one with a "commonality of in-
99. 105 S. Ct. at 747. See supra note 34.
100. IMi
101. 105 S. Ct. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion.
102. Justice Powell recognized that "[o]f necessity, teachers have a degree of famili-
arity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the
relationship between parent and child." Id
For an excellent discussion of the teacher-student relationship and its significance in
public school searches, see Trosch, Williams & DeVore, supra note 17, at 55-58.
103. 105 S. Ct. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring).
terests."'10 4 Not only does the teacher have a responsibility to
educate the student, but he or she is also responsible for the student's
safety and welfare.
Justice Powell concluded by accentuating the establishment of dis-
cipline and maintenance of order as prerequisites to fulfillment of
school officials' primary duty, namely to educate and train young
people. It was, therefore, completely proper to limit schoolchildren's
fourth amendment rights, but more emphasis should have been
placed on the special characteristics of the schoolhouse setting.l0 5
2. Searches by Public School Authorities Create Exceptional
Circumstances Justifying Another Exception to the Probable
Cause Standard and Warrant Requirement; However, the
Balancing Test Is Not the Rule
Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion106 in which
he agreed with the majority's classification of student searches as an
exception to the warrant requirement and probable cause standard,
but disagreed with the rule employed. He reasoned that teachers
must discipline students frequently and immediately, to not only
maintain order in the classroom so that the educational process pro-
gresses uninterrupted, but to protect the very safety of the students
and school personnel as well.107 The overpowering need for immedi-
ate action makes the warrant requirement completely inappropriate
in the school setting. Furthermore, teachers do not have the knowl-
edge and training of the details of probable cause that law enforce-
ment officials possess. To burden teachers with the task of becoming
knowledgeable on the probable cause standard would take away from
their and the school system's primary function: to educate and train
young people.108
Justice Blackmun was troubled by the majority's implication that
the rule for determining the reasonableness of a search was the "bal-
ancing test." He did not join the majority opinion on this point, and
filed a separate opinion in order to reiterate the fact that probable
cause is the standard to be applied for determining the reasonable-
ness of a search. 0 9 He believed the majority needlessly employed
104. Id at 748.
105. Id. at 747.
106. Id. at 748 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 749-50.
108. Id at 750.
109. The majority stated that "[t]he determination of the standard of reasonable-
ness governing any specific class of searches requires balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at 741. Justice Blackmun stressed
that the "balancing test" is not the rule as the majority expressed. See supra note 79
and accompanying text. The rule regarding the determination of the reasonableness of
a search is contained within the warrant and probable cause requirements. "Only in
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the "balancing test" rather than correctly expressing it as an excep-
tion to the rule.11o
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Probable Cause Has Always Been the Standard Used to
Determine the Reasonableness of a Full-Scale Search
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's conclusion that the
fourth amendment was applicable to public school officials while
searching students. However, he disagreed with the majority's use of
the reasonablenessill standard. After reviewing several past Court
decisions,112 the dissent stressed that it had never held a full-scale
search based upon a suspicion lower than probable cause to be rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment. In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan accused the majority of adopting a broad exception 'to
fourth amendment requirements that is "unclear, unprecedented,
and unnecessary. "113
Justice Brennan did agree with the majority that a warrant excep-
tion was appropriate for searches conducted by public school officials.
He sharply disagreed, however, with the majority's use of the "bal-
ancing test" to justify the warrant exception.1 4 An exception to the
warrant requirement requires more than just the governmental in-
terest in law enforcement; it requires a "special governmental inter-
est beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers."115 The
school setting is the subject of a special governmental interest, and
therefore, classification of searches by public school officials as an ex-
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is
a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." Md at
749 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun stated that the school setting is, in fact, one of these exceptional
circumstances; thus, applying the "balancing test" is entirely inappropriate. 105 S. Ct.
at 749 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
110. 105 S. Ct. at 749 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. 1& at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 750-51, Justice Brennan pointed out three well-settled precedents: first,
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967); second, full-scale searches, whether pursuant to a warrant or a warrant excep-
tion situation, must be based upon probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);
and third, a search that is not full-scale, but is somewhat less intrusive, may be based
on a suspicion less than probable cause, Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
113. 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 751. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 751 (emphasis in original).
ception to the warrant requirement is entirely appropriate. 116
Justice Brennan was deeply troubled with the majority's use of the
"balancing test" to determine the reasonableness of the full-scale
search of Respondent's purse.117 The Court first introduced the "bal-
ancing test" in Terry v. Ohio,118 and its application has been limited
since then to specific situations in which the invasion of privacy was
minimal.119 Justice Brennan emphasized that the balancing test was
not a proper measure of the propriety of the full-scale search of Re-
spondent's purse, but that probable cause has always been required
for such a search to be reasonable.' 20
Justice Brennan remarked that even assuming the "balancing test"
was proper under the circumstances, the test applied by the majority
was incorrect.121 The government's interest, as part of the balance, is
not "the need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public
order," as the majority stated.122 The correct balance would be be-
tween "the costs of applying traditional Fourth Amendment stan-
dards"123 and "the serious privacy interest of the student."'124
Applying the probable cause standard that he believed to be
proper, Justice Brennan concluded that the search of Respondent's
purse violated the fourth amendment. 125 Once the vice principal
spotted the cigarettes in Respondent's purse, the search was com-
pleted. Thereafter, the sight of cigarette rolling papers did not give
the vice principal probable cause to believe marijuana was present. A
police officer could not obtain a search warrant to search a house
based upon his knowledge that cigarette rolling papers were pres-
116. Id. at 752. "A teacher or principal could neither carry out essential teaching
functions nor adequately protect student's safety if required to wait for a warrant
before conducting a necessary search." Id,
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 86, 87.
119. See supra note 18. The search of Respondent's purse was undoubtedly a full-
scale search, and not a "mere" minimal intrusion of her privacy. 105 S. Ct. at 751
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 105 S. Ct. at 752-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority failed to cite a sin-
gle case in which a full-scale search based upon a suspicion less than probable cause
was held to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. In fact, the authority as-
serts the contrary. See supra notes 17 & 18.
121. 105 S. Ct. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan believes that the unde-
fined reasonableness standard adopted by the majority will cause uncertainty among
teachers. Such uncertainty may cause teachers to refrain from searching students
even when probable cause exists. Id at 756-57.
122. Id, at 741 (White, J., for the majority).
123. Id. at 757 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These traditional fourth amendment stan-
dards require probable cause to exist before a full-scale search can be conducted by a
public school official. However, when the intrusion is minimal, a lesser standard
would be proper. Id.
124. Id
125. Id
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ent.i 26 Since probable cause did not exist to continue the search, the
vice principal violated the fourth amendment. Under this line of
analysis the search was unreasonable.127
Justice Brennan generally agreed with the majority's findings that
the fourth amendment applied to searches by public school officials
and that such searches were exempt from the warrant requirement.
His diversion was to the degree of suspicion needed to conduct a rea-
sonable search. Brennan insisted that the probable cause standard
should have been applied since the search of Respondent's purse was
more than a minimal intrusion; it was, in fact, a full-scale search.
2. The Majority Should Have Addressed the Exclusionary
Rule Issue
Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion,128 in which he ac-
cused the majority of "unnecessarily and inappropriately reach[ing]
out to decide a constitutional question."129 The Court should have re-
solved the issue of whether or not the exclusionary rule applies to
exclude evidence illegally seized by a public school official.130
Addressing the exclusionary rule issue, Justice Stevens agreed
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding that evidence seized in
an illegal search by a public school official should be excluded in
criminal proceedings.' 3 ' It was emphasized that the evidence found
in Respondent's purse was being used in criminal proceedings, not
school disciplinary proceedings; therefore, Respondent's fourth
amendment constitutional rights should be protected.132
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's classification of a search
by public school officials as an exception to the warrant requirement,
but did not agree with the reasonableness standard adopted. A war-
rantless search by school officials is completely proper if it pertains
to "violent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct."133 However,
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
130. 105 S. Ct. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented from
the Court's request for reargument to decide whether the vice principal's search did, in
fact, violate the fourth amendment. See 104 S. Ct. at 3583 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
stressed that the Court should not decide issues that are not presented to it because
"judicial activism undermines the Court's power to perform its central mission in a le-
gitimate way." 105 S. Ct. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. 105 S. Ct. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
the reasonableness test adopted by the Court134 would permit teach-
ers to search students for the most trivial violations of school
rules. 3 5 A better standard "would permit teachers and school ad-
ministrators to search a student when they have reason to believe
that the search will uncover evidence that the student is violating the
law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school or-
der, or the educational process."136
Applying the "better" standard, Justice Stevens found the search
of Respondent's purse to be unreasonable because smoking cigarettes
in a non-smoking area was "neither unlawful nor significantly dis-
ruptive of school order or the educational process .... ,137 Justice
Stevens disagreed with the standard adopted by the majority because
it "is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth Amendment virtu-
ally meaningless in the school context."138
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. TL.O. significantly
impacted education as well as schoolchildrens' fourth amendment
rights. Its effect was to carve out another well-delineated exception
to the warrant requirement. More importantly, however, the Court
held for the first time that a full-scale search based upon a reason-
able suspicion is constitutional. Thus, a broader exception to the
probable cause standard was established.
With respect to public school officials, the effect of this decision
was to reaffirm their broad authority139 to conduct warrantless
searches of students who are "reasonably believed" to have violated
the law or a school rule. This authority is not, however, so broad as
to allow school officials to conduct strip searches 140 or other searches
that excessively intrude upon students' privacy. The Court expressly
limited public school officials' authority to search so that such
134. See supra notes 86, 87.
135. 105 S. Ct. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (emphasis in original). This suggested "better" standard, asserted by Jus-
tice Stevens, would be more consistent with the Court's precedent because the degree
of the intrusion of the search allowed would depend upon the seriousness of the school
rule violated. Cf Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1984) (a warrantless arrest
of a noncriminal traffic offender was unconstitutional because "the exigent-circum-
stances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when
there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense. . . has been committed").
137. 105 S. Ct. at 766-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 767.
139. Even though New Jersey v. T.L.O. was the first case in which the Supreme
Court decided the public school search issue, the case's real effect is merely an affirm-
ance of the previous rule, adopted by the majority of state and federal courts. See, e.g.,
supra note 25.
140. "One thing is clear under any standard - the shocking strip searches . . .
have no place in the school house." 105 S. Ct. at 765 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
[Vol. 13: 87, 1985] New Jersey v. T.L.O.
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
searches "are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
are not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction."' 4 '
The impact of New Jersey v. T.L.O. upon students is also signifi-
cant. It was reaffirmed that evidence seized by public school officials
from warrantless searches based upon a reasonable suspicion can be
used against students not only in school disciplinary proceedings, but
in criminal proceedings as well. The reaffirmation of such broad au-
thority on the part of school officials, communicates to students and
parents the message that public school districts are serious about
combating drugs and violence in public schools and that they have
the support of the Supreme Court.
However, the Court did leave several questions regarding public
school searches unanswered. First, the question whether the exclu-
sionary rule applies to exclude evidence illegally seized by a public
school official while searching a student;142 second, the question
whether the warrant exception and reasonable suspicion standard ap-
ply to searches of lockers and desks;143 and third, the standard of rea-
sonableness needed when police accompany school officials while
searching students.144 By choosing to leave important fourth amend-
ment questions unanswered, the Court has refrained from deciding
serious issues which will undoubtedly recur in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
"[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments,"'145 and the "government has a heightened obliga-
tion to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school."'4 6 Not
only are public school officials held to their primary duty, to educate
and train young people, but they also are held responsible for the
safety and welfare of students. In order to educate, as well as provide
for the safety and welfare of students, public school officials must be
granted the authority needed to maintain a safe learning environ-
ment. This authority places limitations on schoolchildren's fourth
amendment rights. However, the majority clearly states that to re-
quire a teacher to procure a search warrant based upon probable
141. Id. at 744 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 739 n.3.
143. Id at 741 n.5.
144. Id. at 741 n.5, 744 n.7.
145. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
146. 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
cause would seriously interfere with the educational process. It is
this delicate balance that was at issue in New Jersey v. TL.O. The
court decided that a limitation on students' fourth amendment rights
for the purpose of providing a safe learning environment, was the
most appropriate course of action.
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